Trumping the First Amendment? by Epstein, Lee & Segal, Jeffrey A.
Washington University Journal of Law & Policy 
Volume 21 The Rehnquist Court and the First Amendment 
2006 
Trumping the First Amendment? 
Lee Epstein 
Northwestern University 
Jeffrey A. Segal 
Washington University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy 
 Part of the First Amendment Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Lee Epstein and Jeffrey A. Segal, Trumping the First Amendment?, 21 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 81 (2006), 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol21/iss1/6 
This Essay is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Journal of Law & Policy by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
81 
Trumping the First Amendment?† 
Lee Epstein 
Jeffrey A. Segal* 
The primary goal of this Article is to assess whether the 
relationship between the ideology of Supreme Court Justices and 
their support for the First Amendment guarantees of speech, press, 
assembly, and association has declined, such that left-of-center 
Justices no longer consistently support those guarantees, and right-of-
center Justices no longer consistently support their regulation. 
Utilizing data drawn from the 1953 through 2004 terms of the Court, 
we show that, in disputes in which only First Amendment claims are 
at issue, the more liberal the Justice, the higher the likelihood that he 
or she will vote in favor of litigants alleging an abridgment of their 
rights. That relationship, however, fails to emerge in disputes in 
which other values, such as privacy and equality, are also 
prominently at stake. In these cases, liberal Justices are no more 
likely than their conservative counterparts to support the First 
Amendment; indeed, if anything, a reversal of sorts occurs, with 
conservatives more likely, and liberals less likely, to vote in favor of 
the speech, press, assembly, or association claim. Taken collectively, 
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these results indicate that commitment to First Amendment values is 
no longer a lodestar of liberalism. We consider the implications of 
these findings in light of long-held assumptions of (quantitative) 
political science work on the Court. 
INTRODUCTION 
To say that political scientists have long equated liberalism with a 
fundamental commitment to the First Amendment guarantees of 
speech, press, assembly, and association is hardly an exaggeration.1 
In attempts to empirically assess whether judges make decisions in 
line with their ideological commitments, political scientists almost 
always take into account freedom of expression. When they do, they 
inevitably classify a “liberal” judge as a supporter of expression, and 
a “conservative” judge as a supporter of regulation of expression. In 
other words, in this line of inquiry, support for First Amendment 
freedoms is one of the, if not the, defining features of a “liberal” 
judge, a “liberal” case outcome, or a “liberal” vote.2  
But does a commitment to First Amendment values continue to 
provide a bellwether of liberalism? Many legal academics respond in 
the negative, asserting that unadulterated support for expression 
hardly demonstrates dedication to a left-of-center approach to 
judging.3 Rather, the First Amendment has become an instrumental 
value—one that so-called liberal Justices are all too willing to 
 
 1. Here and throughout the Article, we focus exclusively on the First Amendment 
guarantees of speech, press, assembly, and association. We exclude the free exercise and 
establishment clauses from our analysis. 
 2. The work along these lines is voluminous. Seminal studies include C. HERMAN 
PRITCHETT, THE ROOSEVELT COURT (1948); DAVID W. ROHDE & HAROLD J. SPAETH, 
SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING (1976); GLENDON SCHUBERT, THE JUDICIAL MIND 
(1965). For a recent example, see Kevin T. McGuire & James A. Stimson, The Least 
Dangerous Branch Revisited, 66 J. POL. 1018 (2004).  
 3. See infra Part I. Worth mentioning here, though, are Eugene Volokh’s quantitative 
studies showing that approaches to freedom of speech “no longer . . . break down mostly along 
‘liberal’/‘conservative’ lines, as [they] seemingly did in the 1970s and much of the 1980s.” 
EUGENE VOLOKH, HOW THE JUSTICES VOTED IN FREE SPEECH CASES, 1994–2002, available at 
www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/howvoted.htm (updating Eugene Volokh, How the Justices Voted in 
Free Speech Cases, 1994–2000, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1191 (2001)). For earlier descriptions of the 
trends identified by Professor Volokh, see J.M. Balkin, Ideological Drift and the Struggle over 
Meaning, 25 CONN. L. REV. 869 (1993); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and 
Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 103–04 (1992).  
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abandon when it impedes the achievement of other policy goals, and 
one that conservatives are all too willing to embrace when it 
advances their objectives. So, for example, an otherwise liberties-
oriented Justice may vote against the First Amendment claims of pro-
life activists if those claims stand in the way of women exercising 
their right to obtain an abortion. Likewise, a Justice typically hostile 
to First Amendment claims in, for example, the flag burning context 
may be more willing to embrace them in litigation brought by 
abortion protestors.  
Certainly, we can point to a handful of recent Supreme Court 
decisions that seem to support this claim. In Boy Scouts v. Dale,4 the 
Court’s five “conservatives” (Rehnquist, O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, 
and Thomas) held that the First Amendment prohibited New Jersey 
from requiring the Boy Scouts to admit a gay male;5 the Court’s four 
“liberals” (Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer) dissented.6 
Likewise, in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission,7 the same 
four liberals (joined by O’Connor) upheld major provisions of the 
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act against a First Amendment 
challenge.8 
But does the claim of an ideological reversal regarding the First 
Amendment hold across a larger pool of cases, or is it limited to a 
few well-known exemplars?9 The primary goal of this Article is to 
address this question. Specifically, we examine whether the 
relationship between the ideology of Justices and their support for the 
First Amendment guarantees of speech, press, assembly, and 
association has declined, such that left-of-center Justices no longer 
consistently support those guarantees, and right-of-center Justices no 
longer consistently oppose them.  
 
 4. 530 U.S. 640 (2000).  
 5. Id. at 655. 
 6. Id. at 663. For the basis of these ideological labels, see infra fig.7. 
 7. 540 U.S. 93 (2003). 
 8. Id. at 139. 
 9. In some sense, Eugene Volokh’s quantitative studies, see supra note 3, also attempt to 
address this question. We take a different approach to mapping the ideology of the Justices, but 
our conclusions parallel those of Professor Volokh, as well as of Professors Balkin and 
Sullivan. See supra note 3.  
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Our exploration unfolds in three steps. In Part I, we briefly 
describe the central role that ideology plays in political science 
theories of judging, as well as the measures scholars have developed 
to assess ideology. Our chief purposes here are first, to highlight the 
literature’s long-held assumption that support for the First 
Amendment is a defining feature of liberalism, and second, to 
delineate contemporary objections to this assumption. In Parts II and 
III, we assess the relationship between the Justices’ ideology and 
their voting in First Amendment cases. Utilizing data drawn from the 
1953 through 2004 terms of the Court, we show that, in disputes in 
which only First Amendment claims are at issue, the more liberal the 
Justice, the higher the likelihood that he or she will vote in favor of 
litigants alleging an abridgment of their rights. That relationship, 
however, fails to emerge in disputes in which other values, such as 
privacy and equality, are also at stake. In these cases, liberal Justices 
are no more likely than their conservative counterparts to support the 
First Amendment; indeed, if anything, conservatives are more likely, 
and liberals less likely, to vote in favor of the speech, press, 
assembly, or association claim. Taken collectively, these results 
indicate that commitment to First Amendment values is no longer a 
bellwether of liberalism. While this may not come as news to legal 
academics, it poses something of a challenge to long-held 
assumptions of political science work on the Court. 
I. JUDGING, IDEOLOGY, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
The role of ideology in the study of political behavior has a long 
and distinguished history. Whether writing in the 1940s, the 2000s, or 
eras in between, political scientists have long examined the 
assumption that the ideological commitments of the masses and elites 
alike help explain the political choices they make—from their 
willingness to support particular public policies, to the votes they 
cast.10 As James A. Stimson, the eminent student of public opinion, 
put it, “Ideology won’t go away. It is too important.”11  
 
 10. Political scientists do, however, disagree over the definition of ideology. For a range 
of possibilities, see John Gerring, Ideology: A Definitional Analysis, 50 POL. RES. Q. 957 
(1997). However, we think Bawn’s approach captures contemporary thinking: “Ideology is an 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol21/iss1/6
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With even less controversy, we can say much the same of political 
scientists who study judging.12 These scholars coalesce around the 
idea that ideology is critical to an understanding of the decisions 
judges make. Even more relevant for our purposes, they also tend to 
define liberal judges, votes, and outcomes as supporting First 
Amendment values.  
In what follows, we briefly describe the role that ideology plays in 
political science theories of judging, and the role the First 
Amendment plays in assessing those theories. We end with some 
contemporary challenges to the long-held political science 
assumption that support for the guarantees of free speech, press, and 
association continues to define a liberal ideology, and that support for 
regulation is a hallmark of conservatism. 
A. The Role of Ideology in Political Science Theories of Judging 
Ask ten law professors to articulate a theory of judging, and ten 
different responses are not unlikely. Ditto for political scientists. No 
single theory of judging, much less a unifying paradigm, dominates 
the field. On the other hand, in virtually all political science accounts 
of Court decisions, ideology moves to center stage.13 
According to these accounts, in a nutshell, Justices maximize their 
ideological (or policy) preferences; that is, they bring the law in line 
with their own political commitments. Justices accomplish this 
mission, according to some political science accounts, by voting on 
the basis of their sincerely held ideological (liberal or conservative) 
 
enduring system of beliefs, prescribing what action to take in a variety of political 
circumstances. For example, if an abortion clinic opens in my neighborhood, my ideology tells 
me whether I should (a) picket the entrance (b) write a check to support the clinic, or (c) do 
nothing.” Kathleen Bawn, Constructing “Us”: Ideology, Coalition Politics, and False 
Consciousness, 43 AM. J. POL. SCI. 303, 305 (1999).  
 11. JAMES A. STIMSON, PUBLIC OPINION IN AMERICA 61 (1991). But see Philip Converse, 
The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics, in IDEOLOGY & DISCONTENT 206 (David Apter 
ed., 1964) (arguing that American voters typically lack the attitudinal constraint necessary for 
ideological behavior).  
 12. See, e.g., PRITCHETT, supra note 2; ROHDE & SPAETH, supra note 2; SCHUBERT, 
supra note 2. 
 13. For more on this point, see Lee Epstein et al., The Political (Science) Context of 
Judging, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 783 (2003). 
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attitudes vis-à-vis the facts of cases, and nothing more.14 In other 
words, Scalia “votes the way he does because he is extremely 
conservative; Marshall voted the way he did because he was 
extremely liberal.”15 According to other political science accounts, 
Justices achieve their policy goals by acting strategically, that is, by 
taking into account the preferences and likely actions of actors who 
are in a position to thwart the achievement of their political 
objectives—including Congress, the President, and their own 
colleagues.16  
These accounts may differ in their details, but they do not shift 
their attention from the importance of politics, as opposed to 
principles of law. Neither posits Justices as neutral, principled 
decision makers; rather, both subscribe to Stimson’s general view 
that ideology is a driving force in politics—including on the bench.17 
B. The Role of the First Amendment in Assessing Political Science 
Theories of Judging 
If policy goals unite political science theories of judging, so too 
does their developers’ belief in the importance of assessing the 
implications of their theories against data. In other words, in (most) 
political science circles, theories are a starting, not ending, point in 
research. From theories, we derive observable implications (or 
hypotheses) that we use to test our theories. If data support the 
implications of our theories, we might conclude that our account 
 
 14. For the leading contemporary statement of this account, called “the attitudinal model,” 
see JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL 
MODEL REVISITED (2002).  
 15. Id. at 86. We took the liberty of substituting Justice Scalia for the late Chief Juice 
Rehnquist. 
 16. For a description of strategic accounts, see LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE 
CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998). 
 17. We should offer a caveat to this claim. While it is true that under the attitudinal 
account Justices pursue one and only one goal (policy), on the strategic account, it is up to the 
researcher to specify a priori the Justices’ goals; the researcher may select any motivation(s) he 
or she believes the particular Justices hold. Nonetheless, virtually every existing strategic 
account of judicial decisions posits that Justices pursue policy; that is, their goal is to see public 
policy—the ultimate state of the law—reflect their preferences. One (important) exception is 
John A. Ferejohn & Barry R. Weingast, A Positive Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 12 INT’L 
REV. L. & ECON. 263 (1992) (positing that judges may have jurisprudential goals).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol21/iss1/6
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captures something interesting about judicial decisions; if the data 
fail to align with our expectations, we may go back to the drawing 
board.18 
Crucial to this enterprise, as it pertains to tests of the various 
political science accounts of judging, is defining what we mean by 
“conservative” and “liberal” policy preferences. Without fleshing out 
these terms, we cannot assess the observable implications of either 
the attitudinal or strategic approach. For example, we would be 
unable to determine whether liberal Justices typically cast liberal 
votes, or whether liberal Justices occasionally modulate their votes so 
they are not completely overridden by, for example, Congress. This is 
because liberalism and conservatism are concepts that we cannot 
observe; it is up to researchers to make them susceptible to 
observation by defining what these terms mean when they are 
invoked.  
Simply because we must develop definitions—and precise ones at 
that—does not mean that those definitions are always, or even often, 
precisely the same. Just as those seeking to assess the relative 
liberalism of citizens have developed a range of survey questions 
reflecting different conceptions of ideology, judicial specialists have 
devised an array of methods to categorize the ideology of Justices, 
their votes, and case outcomes. Sometimes the features that go into 
their ideological bundles are relatively compatible (e.g., support for 
defendants in criminal cases); sometimes they are not. In fact, there is 
at least one highly visible instance of a single author changing his 
definitions of ideology midstream; and there are other instances in 
which different authors have produced schemes that are 
contradictory.19  
Yet, in reviewing definitions of ideology invoked in political 
studies of judging, we are struck by a common thread: there are very 
few essays or books in which a commitment to the First Amendment 
guarantees of press, speech, assembly, and association (or a lack 
 
 18. See Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (2002).  
 19. For example, the developer of the U.S. Supreme Court Judicial Database, Harold J. 
Spaeth, at one time defined decisions favoring the government in Takings Clause cases as 
“conservative;” he now defines them as “liberal.” HAROLD J. SPAETH, UNITED STATES 
SUPREME COURT JUDICIAL DATABASE (2005), available at http://www.as.uky.edu/polisci/ 
ulmerproject/sctdata.htm.  
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thereof) was not a part of the author’s conceptual and operational 
approach to assessing ideology. And we could identify none in which 
liberalism failed to hinge on a reading of the First Amendment that 
limits the regulation of expression.20 This holds true for studies 
conducted in every decade since the 1940s; for research that 
contemplates only the First Amendment or is broader in scope; and 
work invoking ideology either as a dependent or independent 
variable.21 In all of these studies, to put it succinctly, a liberal Justice 
is one who supports the First Amendment guarantees of free speech, 
press, assembly, and association; conservatives, in contrast, support 
regulation of those rights.  
C. Challenges to the First Amendment as a Liberal Value 
Even as we write these words, we hear the rejoinders—especially 
from members of the legal community. While at one time “liberal” 
academics may have agreed with the political scientists, as evidenced 
by their condemnation of virtually any private or governmental effort 
to regulate First Amendment freedoms, that time has long since past. 
As Martin Shapiro noted, “almost the entire [F]irst [A]mendment 
literature produced by liberal academics in the past twenty years has 
been a literature of regulation, not freedom—a literature that balances 
away speech rights. . . . Its basic strategy is to treat freedom of speech 
not as an end in itself, but an instrumental value.”22 Hirsch concurs: 
“It has become quite common and even fashionable to have second 
 
 20. We did, however, discover one study that defined judicial decisions upholding 
campaign finance laws as liberal. That study, perhaps not so surprisingly, was co-authored by a 
law professor, Cass R. Sunstein. Cass R. Sunstein et al., Ideological Voting on Federal Courts 
of Appeals: A Preliminary Investigation, 90 VA. L. REV. 301 (2004). In contrast to social 
scientists, legal academics have long argued that support for First Amendment values is no 
longer a hallmark of liberalism.  
 21. In most empirical research, the investigator asks whether a particular “event” 
influenced a particular “outcome.” We can characterize the events and outcomes as “variables” 
that take on different values. That is, they vary. For example, as we explain in Part II, infra, in 
our study, an “event”—the ideology of the Court—varies from about -6 (very liberal) to 4 (very 
conservative). An “outcome”—a Court decision—can be in favor of the First Amendment claim 
or against it. We typically term the outcomes “dependent variables” and the event an 
“independent variable.” See Epstein & King, supra note 18, at 35. 
 22. Martin Shapiro, Corruption, Freedom and Equality in Campaign Financing, 18 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 385, 393 (1989).  
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thoughts about the First Amendment. In the academy, in the civil 
liberties and civil rights communities, and in constitutional law, the 
liberal orthodoxy that governed decades of thinking about the First 
Amendment has disintegrated.”23 On these accounts, even ardent civil 
libertarians are willing to put aside First Amendment guarantees 
when they cut into other “trumping” values, such as equality and 
privacy. For example, limitations on racist language are to be 
encouraged to eradicate bigotry and intimidation; curtailments on 
pro-life protesters are to be tolerated to protect the right to abortion; 
and regulations on materials and speech that degrade women are to 
be applauded in the name of sex-based equality.  
Undoubtedly, as perusal of the law reviews reveals, there is truth 
to Shapiro’s and Hirch’s observations. Whether emanating from 
critical legal scholars, race and feminist theorists, or even proponents 
of economic approaches to law, proposals to regulate free expression 
abound in one way or another.24  
These writings are normative in nature. More relevant for our 
purposes is the growing body of positive legal literature that points to 
a shift on the Court regarding the First Amendment—such that we 
“can no longer assume that the Left generally sides with speakers and 
the Right with the government.”25 In support of this claim, scholars 
point to a string of contemporary decisions including, but certainly 
not limited to, the following cases.  
 
 23. H.N. Hirsch, Second Thoughts on the First Amendment, in CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS 
223 (Sotirios A. Barber & Robert P. George eds., 2001).  
 24. The literature along these lines is voluminous. Some recent examples include 
RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, UNDERSTANDING WORDS THAT WOUND (2004) 
(arguing in favor of regulating forms of hate speech); Lynn Mills Eckert, The Incoherence of 
the Zoning Approach to Regulating Pornography: The Exclusion of Gender and a Call for 
Category Refinement in Free Speech Doctrine, 4 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 863, 863 (2003) 
(supporting “regulation justified on the basis of pornography’s specifically gender-based harms 
as well as its more general, community-based harms”); Miranda Oshige McGowan, Certain 
Illusions About Speech: Why the Free-Speech Critique of Hostile Work Environment 
Harassment Is Wrong, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 391, 394 (2002) (“The government’s interest in 
ensuring equal opportunity in ordinary workplaces generally outweighs employees’ interests in 
engaging in unfettered debate at work.”); see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE 
PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1993). 
 25. Volokh, supra note 3, at 1198. 
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First, scholars point to Madsen v. Women’s Health Center,26 in 
which the Court upheld an injunction that prohibited pro-life groups 
from protesting within thirty-six feet of an abortion clinic and 
restricted noise levels,27 but held bans on protest activity within three 
hundred feet of a clinic or private residence unconstitutional.28 Three 
of the Court’s most conservative members (Scalia, Kennedy, and 
Thomas) dissented from that portion of the judgment that upheld the 
thirty-six-foot zone and noise restrictions on the ground that such 
curtailments “were profoundly at odds with First Amendment 
precedents and traditions.”29 
Second, scholars note Morse v. Republican Party of Virginia,30 in 
which the Court’s four most liberal members (joined by Justice 
O’Connor) held that the Republican Party’s imposition of a 
registration fee as a condition of participation for the election of the 
Party’s Senate candidate required preclearance under the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965.31 The Court’s four most conservative members 
dissented, all of whom were troubled by the First Amendment 
concerns “presented by governmental intrusion into political party 
functions.”32  
Scholars also point out Boy Scouts v. Dale,33 in which the five 
conservative Justices (Rehnquist, O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and 
Thomas) held that the application of New Jersey’s public 
accommodations law to require the Boy Scouts to admit a gay male 
violated the Boy Scouts’ First Amendment rights.34 The Court’s 
liberals (Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer) dissented.35 Writing 
for the dissenters, Justice Stevens acknowledged the importance of 
free speech and association, but emphasized that prejudice against 
gays is “still prevalent” in American society.36 This situation “can 
 
 26. 512 U.S. 753 (1994). 
 27. Id. at 770. 
 28. Id. at 775. 
 29. Id. at 785. 
 30. 517 U.S. 186 (1996). 
 31. Id. at 201. 
 32. Id. at 290. 
 33. 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
 34. Id. at 659. 
 35. Id. at 663. 
 36. Id. at 700. 
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only be aggravated,” Stevens wrote, “by the creation of a 
constitutional shield for a policy that is itself the product of a habitual 
way of thinking about strangers.”37 
Finally, scholars note McConnell v. Federal Election 
Commission,38 in which five Justices (Stevens, O’Connor, Souter, 
Ginsburg, and Breyer) upheld the major provisions of the Bipartisan 
Campaign Reform Act against a First Amendment challenge.39 
Writing in dissent, Justice Thomas claimed that the majority’s 
conclusion “is antithetical to everything for which the First 
Amendment stands.”40 Rehnquist, Scalia, and Kennedy also 
dissented.41 
These examples, to be sure, shore up claims as to the willingness 
of seemingly liberal Justices to abandon the First Amendment when it 
conflicts with values of greater importance to them. However, they 
also demonstrate the willingness of conservatives to embrace the 
Amendment when its guarantees suit their purposes. In these 
disputes, unadulterated support for the First Amendment was hardly a 
hallmark of liberalism; but neither was unadulaterated opposition a 
lodestar of conservatism. 
II. ASSESSING COMPETING CLAIMS ABOUT THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
Without doubt, the cases of Madsen, Morse, Dale, and McConnell 
are suggestive: Justices who we might, under traditional definitions, 
deem “liberal” supported restrictions on expression, and 
“conservative” Justices opposed the regulations at issue. What these 
examples fail to provide, however, is a conclusive rebuttal to 
empirical political science work that continues to invoke support for 
(or opposition to) the First Amendment as a critical component of a 
liberal (or conservative) ideology. Making such a case requires a far 
more systematic evaluation of the Justices’ ideology and their votes 
 
 37. Id.  
 38. 540 U.S. 93 (2003). 
 39. Id. at 139. 
 40. Id. at 274. 
 41. Id. at 248, 286, 350. 
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in First Amendment disputes, not just an analysis of a few self-
selected exemplars.42  
We undertake that challenge here, exploring the votes cast by the 
Justices in all First Amendment cases decided between the 1953 and 
2004 terms. In what follows, we provide more details about two 
building blocks of our study—the cases and the Justices.  
A. The Cases 
To assess the view that a reversal of sorts has occurred in First 
Amendment litigation over free speech, press, assembly, and 
association—with liberal Justices no longer fully committed to 
supporting free expression, and conservative Justices no longer fully 
committed to supporting government regulation thereof—we must 
identify the relevant pool of cases and determine whether or not the 
Justices voted in support of the litigant claiming a violation of his or 
her liberties.  
The existence of Harold J. Spaeth’s U.S. Supreme Court Database 
makes amassing data on the Court’s First Amendment decisions a 
relatively straightforward task.43 This database, which many scholars 
have used to study law and judicial politics,44 contains information on 
over two hundred attributes of Court decisions—including the law or 
constitutional provision at issue and whether the Justices ruled in 
favor of or against individuals claiming a violation of First 
Amendment guarantees—in all cases decided with an opinion by the 
Court since the 1953 term.45  
 
 42. See also Volokh, supra note 3 (attempting to move beyond the “few-representative-
cases” approach). 
 43. SPAETH, supra note 19.  
 44. See, e.g., Ruth Colker & Kevin M. Scott, Dissing States?: Invalidation of State Action 
During the Rehnquist Era, 88 VA. L. REV. 1301, 1305 n.8, 1324–45 (2002) (relying on the 
Spaeth database to assess theories of federalism in the Rehnquist court); Frank B. Cross & 
Blake J. Nelson, Strategic Institutional Effects on Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 95 NW. U. 
L. REV. 1437, 1483–91 (2001) (relying on the Spaeth database to investigate the institutional 
context of the Court); Lee Epstein et al., The Supreme Court During Crisis: How War Affects 
Only Non-War Cases, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2005) (using the Spaeth database to study the effect 
of war on Supreme Court decisions); Youngsik Lim, An Empirical Analysis of Supreme Court 
Justices’ Decision Making, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 721, 733 n.19, 733–48 (2000) (employing the 
Spaeth database to assess stare decisis). 
 45. See SPAETH, supra note 19. 
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For the time period of interest, the Spaeth database identifies 506 
disputes in which the First Amendment guarantees of press, speech, 
assembly, or association were at stake, representing approximately 
eight percent of all orally argued disputes resolved between the 1953 
and 2004 terms.46 Two types of these cases were of particular interest 
to us. The first, what we call “pure” disputes, are those that, by and 
large, do not require the Justices to weigh First Amendment 
guarantees against any other constitutional or political value. Texas v. 
Johnson47 provides an example. Here, the Justices determined simply 
whether Texas’ flag desecration law violated the First Amendment; 
the competing values of, say, equality or privacy did not come into 
play.48 The second category of interest includes those cases in which 
another issue, liberty, or right substantially enters the picture. We 
label these “value-conflict” cases, and they include (but are not 
limited to) the four disputes listed above: Madsen, Morse, Dale, and 
McConnell.49 
As seen in Figure 1, across the entire forty-year period, pure First 
Amendment disputes well outnumber those with value-conflicts: 
82.41% (n=417) versus 17.59% (n=89).50 Interestingly (though 
perhaps not surprisingly), this picture is changing. While value-
conflict suits constituted only 5% of the 157 cases decided by the 
 
 46. Id.  
 47. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).  
 48. Id. at 399. 
 49. Several colleagues, including Eugene Volokh and Abner S. Greene, have suggested to 
us that the distinction between pure and value-conflict cases may be one without meaning 
because in all disputes a competing interest exists. This is no doubt true, but to us, the question 
is one of degree. For example, in terms of the “tension” between a First Amendment claim and 
another (typically, “constitutionally-grounded”) value, a Texas v. Johnson and a Boy Scouts v. 
Dale seem quite distinct. For more on this general point, see Eugene Volokh, Freedom of 
Speech and the Constitutional Tension Method, 3 U. CHI. ROUNDTABLE 223, 224 (1996) 
(exploring the Court’s use of the “constitutional tension method,” which involves ”identifying 
certain values that the Constitution protects and suggesting that the Constitution’s free speech 
guarantee must sometimes yield to these values”).  
 If this is so, the task becomes one of categorizing cases as pure or value conflict. We can 
imagine a number of possible approaches, see, e.g., Volokh, supra. We take one that, at the 
very least, is reproducible and that inter-coder reliability tests have validated: value-conflict 
cases are First Amendment cases identified by Spaeth as also including a non-First Amendment 
issue (e.g., civil rights or privacy); pure cases are those in which, according to Spaeth, the Court 
did not consider a non-First Amendment issue. See SPAETH, supra note 19. 
 50. See infra p. 95, fig.1. 
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Warren Court (1953 through 1968 terms), by the Rehnquist Court era 
(1986 through 2004 terms), that figure had risen dramatically, to 
27.97% (40 out of 143 cases).51 
With the relevant cases in hand, one task remained: determining 
whether or not the Justices voted in support of First Amendment 
guarantees. Using the Spaeth database, with certain adaptations made 
for our purposes,52 we were able to make this determination for every 
vote cast by every Justice for all 506 disputes.53 Specifically, we 
defined a liberal vote as one in favor of parties that allege a violation 
of the guarantees of press, speech, assembly, and association. Hence, 
a vote that supports a flag burner is a liberal vote, as is one against 
the campaign finance law at issue in McConnell or one in favor of the 
Boy Scouts in Dale.  
Using this criterion, overall (that is, across the four decades in our 
database) the Court supported claims of deprivation of First 
Amendment liberties in 53.95% of the 506 cases. In light of their 
overwhelming numbers in our database, that figure varied little for 
 
 51. Id.  
 52. Understanding our adaptations requires an understanding of three variables in the 
Spaeth database and how they interact. One is the direction of the decision (and the votes of 
each Justice), which is coded as liberal or conservative. Liberal represents, for example, support 
for the rights of the accused in criminal cases; support for women and minorities in civil rights 
disputes; support for individual rights in First Amendment and privacy litigation; support for 
unions, over both employees and employers, in union cases; and support for government 
regulation of business in economic cases. See SPAETH, supra note 19. 
 Second, there are separate variables in the database that represent the issue or issues in the 
case (e.g., loyalty oaths, clinic access, etc.) and the law or laws (e.g., specific legislative acts or 
constitutional provisions). Id. Any given case could have multiple issues and multiple laws or 
legal provisions.  
 Crucially, the direction of the decision is based on the primary issue in the case, not on the 
law(s) or on any secondary issues. For example, Spaeth identifies Boy Scouts v. Dale, 530 U.S. 
640 (2000), as a Civil Rights case; on the Civil Rights issue, the Court voted conservatively 
(against the Civil Rights claim), even though it voted liberally on the First Amendment issue. 
Id. at 659. Accordingly, Spaeth codes the case and the votes of the majority Justices as 
conservative, and the dissenting Justices as liberal. See SPAETH, supra note 19. 
 To ensure that the direction variables (both for the Court and the individual Justices) were 
consistent with our First Amendment concerns, we checked the coding of those variables for 
any case in which the law variable included the First Amendment, but the issue variable 
included a non-First Amendment issue. For example, to include Dale as a First Amendment 
case, we altered the coding from a conservative Civil Rights decision to a liberal First 
Amendment decision. We repeated this procedure for cases in which a second- or subsequent-
listed issue involved First Amendment concerns, but the first-listed issue did not. 
 53. See infra p. 96, fig.2. 
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the 417 pure cases (56.83%), but it was significantly lower for the 89 
conflict cases (40.45%).54 
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Figure 1: Pure and value-conflict First Amendment cases, by Chief Justice era. For the 
Warren Court (1953–1968 terms), N=157; for the Burger Court (1969–1985 terms), 
N=206; for the Rehnquist Court (1986–2004 terms), N=143.55 
Looking at the three Chief Justice eras, as seen in Figure 2, we 
observe that in pure cases, the liberal Warren Court was far more 
likely to vote in favor of the First Amendment litigant than other 
Courts—71.81% versus 46.06% for the Burger Court and 52.43% for 
the Rehnquist Court. Note, however, that in the eight Warren Court 
disputes that presented a conflict of values, the percentage drops to 
only 25%.  
 
 54. Pearson χ2 = 7.926; p = 0.005. 
 55. We identified the First Amendment cases from Spaeth’s database. See SPAETH, supra 
note 19. 
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Figure 2: Proportion of decisions supporting First Amendment claims, by pure and 
value-conflict cases and Chief Justice era. For the Warren Court (1953–1968 terms), 
N=157; for the Burger Court (1969–1985 terms), N=206; for the Rehnquist Court 
(1986–2004 terms), N=143.56 
B. The Justices 
Identifying the First Amendment cases and determining the 
direction of the Court’s (and each Justice’s) decisions are necessary 
but insufficient steps to assess claims about First Amendment 
guarantees; we also must characterize each Justice as liberal, 
conservative, or something in between.  
Political scientists have taken two broad approaches to assessing 
judicial ideology: exogenous and endogenous measures. Exogenous 
measures are those that are completely independent of the votes that 
the Justices cast; endogenous measures rely at least in part on those 
votes. Exogenous measures have the benefit of independence; 
endogenous measures have the benefit of greater precision. The 
 
 56. Id.  
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choice between the two depends substantially on the goals of the 
study. 
When the goal is explanation, scholars prefer exogenous measures 
because explaining votes with measures derived (even in part) from 
votes involves a degree of circularity. But if we take as given—as we 
do for purposes of this Article—that ideology drives Supreme Court 
behavior, and wish to describe how that works (e.g., whether liberals 
or conservatives are most likely to support First Amendment values), 
we need the most precise measure possible. Therefore, we utilize in 
the text findings yielded from an endogenous measure; in Appendix 
A, we supply the results produced by an exogenous measure. Ideally, 
findings from both will result in similar answers, thus giving added 
confidence to our conclusions. Almost universally, that is what we 
find. 
While social scientists and legal academics have proposed several 
operational approaches to measuring ideology endogenously, we rely 
here on a vote-based measure developed by Andrew D. Martin and 
Kevin Quinn.57 Derived from analyses of voting patterns on the 
Supreme Court each term—meaning that the Justices’ ideal points 
can and do change over time—the “M-Q” scores are theoretically 
unbounded.58 For the Justices in our dataset, however, they range 
from a very liberal -6 (Justice Douglas) to a very conservative +4 
(Justice Thomas).59  
Figure 3 underscores these points about the range and dynamic 
nature of the Martin-Quinn approach. Figure 3 depicts the ideological 
estimates for Justices serving on three courts, in 1963, 1983, and 
2003. Note, first, the range, from an exceptionally liberal Justice 
Douglas in the 1963 term to the exceptionally conservative Justice 
Thomas in the 2003 term. Now consider the dynamic character of the 
 
 57. We used a modified version of the scores developed by Martin and Quinn. These 
scores are available at Ideal Points for the U.S. Supreme Court, http://adm.wustl.edu/supct.php 
(last visited May 16, 2006). For more details about their creation, see Andrew D. Martin & 
Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation Via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. 
Supreme Court, 1953-1999, 10 POL. ANALYSIS 134 (2002), available at http://adm.wustl.edu/ 
pdfs/pa02.pdf. We adapt our description of the Martin & Quinn ideal point estimates from Lee 
Epstein et al., The Judicial Common Space, __ J.L. ECON. & ORG. (forthcoming 2006).  
 58. See Martin & Quinn, supra note 57.  
 59. Id.  
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estimates, such that Justice Brennan’s ideal point estimate of -0.83 in 
1963 was considerably more moderate than his 1983 estimate (-2.82). 
On the other hand, Rehnquist was more moderate during his 
penultimate term as Chief Justice (in 2003) than during his associate 
days (1983 term).  
Even from this brief description of the Martin-Quinn scores, their 
assets for our project move into relief. They are susceptible to 
replication and demonstrate strong facial validity; that is, they square 
with our overall impressions of the ideology of the Justices. In Figure 
3, notice, for example, that Justices Scalia and Thomas, generally 
considered the most reliably conservative members of the Rehnquist 
Court, anchor the right end, and Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, the 
left. Of equal importance for our purposes is that ideological 
estimates are available for all Justices and all terms in our dataset, 
thus enabling us to assess whether liberals generally support the First 
Amendment and conservatives support regulation for each year under 
analysis.  
Of course, we understand a potential critique of this measurement 
strategy: because Martin and Quinn derive their estimates from 
voting records, our invocation of them here appears to be using votes 
to predict votes. One solution would be to remove the First 
Amendment cases from the data used to generate the Martin-Quinn 
estimates and recompute them. By purging the particular issue at 
interest, in other words, the Martin-Quinn scores are more 
appropriate for use in research as to the role of the Justices’ 
preferences in their decision making. 
While there is nothing inherently wrong with this solution, Martin 
and Quinn themselves show that it is not necessary for analyses of the 
sort conducted here—an analysis of a particular issue area. They 
note:  
As a practical matter using the full data Martin-Quinn scores 
when modeling votes in a single issue is perfectly appropriate. 
While circularity is a technical concern, the resultant measures 
from purging issues will change very little, and so it is not 
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worth the effort to do so. When modeling votes in a single 
issue area, circularity is not a practical concern.60  
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
Douglas Black Warren Goldberg Brennan White Clark Stewart Harlan
1963 Term
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
Marshall Brennan Stevens Blackmun White Powell Burger O'Connor Rehnquist
1983 Term
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
Stevens Souter Breyer Ginsburg O'Connor Kennedy Rehnquist Scalia Thomas
2003 Term
 
Figure 3: Martin & Quinn’s ideal point estimates, 1963, 1983, 2003 terms. We have 
ordered (on the horizontal axis) the Justices serving during each term from most liberal 
to most conservative based on the estimates of their ideal points, which are depicted on 
the vertical axis. The vertical axes run from most liberal (here, -6) to most 
conservative (+4).61 
Nonetheless, to mitigate concerns as to the use of a vote-based 
measure to explain votes, we replicate all analyses using an 
exogenous approach to ideology: the Segal-Cover scores.62 Appendix 
A houses these results; they mirror almost precisely the findings 
depicted in the text. 
 
 60. Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Can Ideal Point Estimate Be Used as 
Explanatory Variables? 3 (Oct. 8, 2005) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://adm.wustl. 
edu/supct/resnote.pdf (last visited May 16, 2006)).  
 61. Martin & Quinn, supra note 57.  
 62. See infra note 86. 
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III. RESULTS 
With the ideological scores and cases in hand, we can now assess 
the relationship between support for the First Amendment and 
Justices’ policy preferences. In what follows, we consider decision 
making at the Court level, and then turn to the votes cast by 
individual Justices. 
A. The Court 
If traditional political science perspectives continue to 
characterize the Court’s treatment of First Amendment claims, we 
would expect to observe a strong relationship between the ideology 
of the Court and the direction of its decisions—such that the more 
liberal the Court, the greater its propensity to rule in favor of litigants 
claiming a violation of their First Amendment rights. To put this 
perspective, we began by using Martin and Quinn’s estimates of the 
ideological location of the median justice for each term in our 
analysis.63 This technique is consistent with public choice and 
jurisprudential theories that emphasize the importance of the swing 
vote, as well as with contemporary commentary stressing the critical 
role that Justice O’Connor (and, to a lesser extent, Justice Kennedy) 
played on the Court by casting key votes in many consequential 
cases.64 
 
 63. See Martin & Quinn, supra note 57 (describing estimates of the median Justice). For 
more details on these estimates, see Andrew D. Martin et al., The Median Justice on the United 
States Supreme Court, 83 N.C. L. REV. 1275 (2005). The reason for choosing the median 
Justice, as we have written elsewhere, see Epstein et al., supra note 44, has a clear and obvious 
grounding in the public choice literature on strategic decisionmaking. See, e.g., DUNCAN 
BLACK, THE THEORY OF COMMITTEES AND ELECTIONS 18 (1958) (demonstrating that median 
voter controls the outcome of any majority vote); Martin et al., supra (proposing a systematic 
approach for identifying median Justice). 
 64. See, e.g., Mario Bergara et al., Modeling Supreme Court Strategic Decision Making, 
28 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 247, 249, 253 (2003) (employing median-Justice theory in analyzing the 
effects of institutional constraints on Supreme Court decisionmaking); R. Randall Kelso & 
Charles D. Kelso, Swing Votes on the Current Supreme Court, 29 PEPP. L. REV. 637, 638–39 
(2002) (discussing the role of swing Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter in fifty-four 
Supreme Court decisions between 1997 and 2000); Jeffrey A. Segal, Separation-of-Powers 
Games in the Positive Theory of Congress and Courts, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 28, 41–42 (1997) 
(testing the separation-of-powers model with data on median Justices’ positions). The role of 
the pivotal Justice is deeply rooted in the theory of the median voter. See also Harold Hotelling, 
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Figure 4 depicts these Court “swings,” with Court terms on the 
horizontal axis and the relative liberalness of the median Justice on 
the vertical axis. These data are consistent with commonly held 
intuitions about particular Court eras. Note, for example, the high 
level of liberalism during the Warren Court years (1953 through 1968 
terms), and the low levels thereafter as Justices appointed by 
Republican Presidents Richard M. Nixon, Ronald Reagan, and 
George H.W. Bush ascended to the bench.  
To determine whether the Court’s (i.e., the median Justice’s) 
ideology helps account for decisions in the free expression context, 
we estimated a probit model with the direction of the majority’s 
decision (either for or against the litigant claiming a First 
Amendment violation) as the dependent variable, and ideology as the 
sole independent variable.65 
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Figure 4: The political ideology of the median Justice on the U.S. Supreme Court, 
1953–2004 terms. The line depicts the Martin-Quinn estimate of location of the 
median Justice for each term. The scores indicated on the vertical axis measure 
liberalness, ranging from -1 (most liberal) to +1 (most conservative).66 
 
Stability in Competition, 39 ECON. J. 41, 53–57 (1929) (discussing the general tendency for 
excessive conglomeration near a median position). 
 65. See supra note 21. 
 66. For Martin-Quinn estimates of the location of the median Justice, see Martin & Quinn, 
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Through this exercise, not only does a statistically significant 
relationship emerge between the Court’s ideology and its decisions,67 
but one that is substantively meaningful as well. Figure 5 illustrates 
this by plotting the range of ideology of the median Justice against 
the predicted probability that the Court would decide in favor of 
litigants alleging an abridgment of their liberties. Note that as we 
move from an extremely liberal (-.8) to an extremely conservative 
(1.0) Court, this probability decreases from .7868 to .40.69 In more 
concrete terms, during the Warren Court era, when the median Justice 
was -.01,70 the predicted probability of a pro-First Amendment 
decision was .63 (with a 95% confidence interval of .58-.68). During 
the Rehnquist Court years, that figure fell to .49 (with a 95% 
confidence interval of .44-.54).71 
Replicating this analysis for the 417 pure First Amendment cases 
produces similar results: the Court’s ideology and its decisions are 
significantly related.72 In substantive terms, we predict that a very 
left-of-center Court, such as the Warren Court in its 1968 term (-.781 
ideology), would rule in favor of the First Amendment litigant in 
 
supra note 57. 
 67. Specifically, the estimates are as follows (where ** indicates p < .01; and Std. Errs. 
are robust standard errors clustered on term):  
Variables Coefficient (Std. Err.) 
Ideology of the Court -0.578** (0.132) 
Intercept 0.325** (0.074) 
   
N 506 
Log-likelihood -337.276 
χ2(1) 19.246 
 
 68. The 95% confidence interval is .69–.86. 
 69. The 95% confidence interval is .33–.48. 
 70. This represents the mean score of the median Justice between the 1953 and 1968 
terms. 
 71. The mean score of the median Justice was a rather conservative .54. 
 72. The estimates for the 417 pure cases are as follows (where ** indicates p < .01; and 
Std. Errs. are robust standard errors clustered on term):  
Variables Coefficient (Std. Err.) 
Ideology of the Court -0.624** (0.165) 
Intercept 0.406** (0.094) 
   
N 417 
Log-likelihood -272.99 
χ2(1) 14.283 
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eight out of every ten “pure” cases (predicted probability = .81, with 
a 95% percent confidence interval of .68–.90). In contrast, a very 
right-of-center Court, such as the Burger Court in its 1975 term (.58 
ideology), would support the First Amendment claim in 
approximately one out of every two “pure” cases (.52, with a 
confidence interval of .45–.58).73  
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Figure 5: The effect of ideology on Supreme Court voting on First Amendment claims. 
The solid line shows the predicted probability that the Court would decide in favor of a 
litigant alleging an abridgment of First Amendment liberties, when we set the Court’s 
ideology at very liberal (-.80), very conservative (1), and in-between levels (-.7 to .9). 
The dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals.74 
 
 73. We used CLARIFY to compute these predictions. See Gary King, Software, 
http://gking.harvard.edu/stats/shtml (last visited May 16, 2006). For the underlying model, see 
supra note 72. 
 74. We computed this figure using CLARIFY, see supra note 73. For more details, see 
Gary King et al., Making the Most of Statistical Analyses, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 347 (2000). For 
the underlying model, see supra note 67.  
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What these results tell us, in short, is that over the 506 cases, as 
well the 417 “pure” cases, ideology provides a reasonable predictor 
of outcome: the more liberal the Court, the more likely it is to rule in 
favor of a party alleging an abridgment of First Amendment liberties. 
That relationship, interestingly enough (and depending on the 
measure of ideology we deploy), either disappears or reverses when 
we focus exclusively on the eighty-nine “value-conflict” cases. Using 
the Martin-Quinn estimates, no statistically significant relationship 
emerges between ideology and First Amendment decisions (p = .82). 
Using the (exogenous) Segal-Cover scores, as in Appendix A, the 
relationship reverses: the level of liberalism is negatively and 
significantly associated with the Court’s decision (p = .02), such that 
the more liberal the Court, the less likely it is to support a First 
Amendment claim in conflict cases.75 
Either way, these findings provide some ammunition for scholars 
who challenge conventional political science notions of liberalism. 
For disputes presenting a conflict of values, support for the 
guarantees of speech, press, assembly, and association is hardly the 
hallmark of a liberal Court, as so many assume. 
B. The Justices 
Thus far our results are provocative. We observe a strong positive 
relationship between the ideology of the Court and the direction of its 
decisions in the great bulk of cases—pure First Amendment disputes. 
For these cases, the more liberal the Court, the more likely it is to rule 
in favor of litigants alleging a violation of their rights. The value-
conflict cases are of a different order: at a minimum, we find no 
relationship between ideology and outcomes; at a maximum, we find 
one that works in the reverse, such that liberal Courts are less likely 
to favor First Amendment claims. Do similar patterns emerge when 
we move away from Court-level decisions and towards the votes cast 
by individual Justices? The answer, as it turns out, is yes. 
 
 75. For more details, see Appendix A. 
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Looking first at all 506 cases, as in Figure 6, the relationship 
between ideology and votes remains quite strong and positive.76 
Specifically, if the ideology of a Justice corresponds to his or her 
votes, we should see conservative Justices (e.g., Rehnquist or Scalia) 
clustered toward the bottom right of Figure 6. Similarly, more liberal 
Justices should cluster near the top left, and moderate Justices should 
appear closer to the middle.  
Overall, this is the pattern we see: the more liberal the Justice, the 
more votes he or she cast in favor of a First Amendment claim. For 
example, based on our calculations, we would expect Antonin 
Scalia—a very conservative Justice with a mean ideal point of 2.51—
to support the litigant alleging a liberties abridgment in 
approximately 31.05% of cases;77 Scalia’s actual value is 38.73%. 
Moving to the highest levels of liberalism—such as Thurgood 
Marshall with a mean ideal point estimate of -2.72—the expected 
percentage of votes favoring the First Amendment claim is 78.23%;78 
Marshall’s actual support is slightly higher, but only slightly 
(80.94%).  
 
 76. For this analysis and all others to follow, we include only those Justices who 
participated in ten or more cases. Figure 6 is based on a regression of the total percentage of 
cases in which the Justice cast a liberal vote on the mean of the Martin-Quinn ideal point 
estimate for each Justice (since the 1953 term). The estimates are as follows (where ** indicates 
p < .01): 
Variables Coefficient (Std. Err.) 
Justice’s Ideology -0.090** (0.016) 
Intercept 0.537** (0.028) 
   
N 28 
R2 0.564 
F(1,26) 33.701 
Note that this analysis explores Justices’ voting over the course of their careers (the “Justice-
level” analysis). If we disaggregate by case, in other words, if we model the votes of each 
Justice in each case (the “case-level” analysis), the results are quite similar. A probit (clustering 
on Justice) of vote on ideology produces a correctly signed and statistically significant estimate 
(-.256, p < .01).  
 77. The 95% confidence interval is 21.40–39.86. We computed these figures using 
CLARIFY. See supra notes 73, 74. 
 78. The 95% confidence interval is 68.14–88.63. We computed these figures using 
CLARIFY. See supra notes 73, 74. 
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Figure 6: The relationship between the ideology of the Justices and their votes in all First 
Amendment cases, 1953–2004 terms. The dotted line represents a prediction of Justices’ 
votes based on their Martin-Quinn ideal point estimate. The closer a point to the line, the 
stronger the association between ideology and votes cast in all First Amendment cases.79 
Given that pure First Amendment cases comprise a very large 
fraction of our database (417 out of 506), it comes as no surprise that 
this pattern repeats itself as to these disputes. In the pure cases, just as 
across the whole sample, the Justices evince voting behavior 
consistent with the political science literature: liberals generally 
 
 79. For the estimates underlying this figure, see supra note 76. 
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support First Amendment values, and conservatives support 
regulation.80 
If these results mirror our findings for the Court as a whole, so too 
do our results for the value-conflict cases: no statistically significant 
relationship emerges between ideology and votes. In other words, and 
in direct contrast to the patterns displayed in Figures 5 and 6, liberal 
Justices (or Courts, for that matter) are no more or less likely than 
conservatives to support or oppose regulation of First Amendment 
guarantees when another trumping value comes into play (p = 
.154).81 
Given that only eighteen of the Justices in our sample participated 
in ten or more value-conflict cases,82 additional statistical probing of 
this particular (non)-result may prove rather unilluminating.83 But 
several descriptive patterns that emerge from the data are intriguing, 
to say the least.  
 
 80. The following estimates are from a regression of the percentage of pure cases in which 
the Justice cast a liberal vote on the Justice’s political ideology score (where ** indicates p < 
.01):  
Variables Coefficient (Std. Err.) 
Justice’s Ideology -0.083** (0.017) 
Intercept 0.580** (0.031) 
   
N 28 
R2 0.469 
F(1,26) 22.961 
 
 81. Moving to a case-by-case analysis, see supra note 76, produces somewhat different 
results. Across the entire sample of value-conflict cases, liberal Justices remain more likely to 
support the First Amendment claim (p < .01). That same finding emerges in separate analyses 
of the Warren and Burger Court eras, but it does not hold for the Rehnquist Court. For the 1986 
to 2004 terms, no statistically significant relationship emerges between ideology and votes in 
the value-conflict cases. For the last natural Court era (1994 to 2004 terms), however, left-of-
center Justices were significantly more likely to support regulation in cases presenting a clash 
of values, and significantly more likely to support the First Amendment claim in pure First 
Amendment disputes. For more on this point, see Figure 7 and Appendix B. 
 82. See supra note 76. 
 83. But see supra note 81 and app. B. 
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Figure 7: Proportion of votes supporting First Amendment claims, by pure and value-
conflict cases. The proportions are derived from votes cast since the start of the 
Rehnquist Court in the 1986 term through its conclusion in the 2004 term. We order 
the Justices from most liberal to most conservative based on Martin & Quinn’s ideal 
point estimates for the 2004 term (excluding First Amendment cases).84 
Consider, for example, the data depicted in Figure 7. Figure 7 
shows the proportion of cases in which each member of the 2004 
Court voted for or against the First Amendment claim in pure cases 
and in those presenting a conflict of values during the Rehnquist 
years (1986 through 2004 terms). 
Observe the rather sharp pattern that emerges: The Court’s most 
liberal members (Stevens, Ginsburg, Souter, and, to a lesser extent, 
Breyer) were more supportive of First Amendment claims in pure 
disputes than in value-conflict cases, while three of the four 
conservative Justices (Thomas, Scalia, and Kennedy) evince 
precisely the opposite behavior.85 Note, too, that for the Court’s most 
extreme members, the differences are quite stark. On the left end of 
 
 84. See supra note 58. 
 85. For more rigorous support of this description of behavior on the Rehnquist Court, see 
app. B. 
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the spectrum, Justice Stevens was all too willing to vote in favor of 
the liberties claim in pure cases (nearly 70%), and all too willing to 
support regulation in the conflict cases (in only 40% did he support 
the First Amendment claim). Justice Thomas exhibits mirror image 
behavior, supporting the First Amendment in only about 40% of the 
pure cases, but in nearly 70% of the conflict disputes. 
Justices Stevens and Thomas are the starkest cases, but they are 
not alone. Indeed, only Justice O’Connor and Chief Justice Rehnquist 
were consistent First Amendment voters. O’Connor, as Figure 7 
shows, was consistently moderate, voting to support freedom of 
expression in four out of every ten cases, regardless of whether 
another value entered into play. Rehnquist was consistently 
conservative: across the board, in pure or in conflict cases, he was the 
Court’s most ardent supporter of regulation of First Amendment 
guarantees. 
IV. DISCUSSION 
In more empirical studies than we can recount here, political 
scientists have equated liberalism with a fundamental commitment to 
the First Amendment guarantees of speech, press, assembly, and 
association, and have linked conservatism with a commitment to the 
regulation of those guarantees. Our results suggest a fundamental 
flaw with this equation. At least with regard to the U.S. Supreme 
Court, left-of-center Justices are no more likely than their right-of-
center counterparts to support the First Amendment in disputes in 
which other values are at stake. In fact, if our descriptive analysis of 
the Justices of the Rehnquist Court is any indication,86 precisely the 
opposite relationship emerges: it is liberals who support regulation, 
and conservatives who embrace the First Amendment.  
These results are fascinating, if for no other reason than that they 
suggest that unadulterated support for freedom of expression is 
hardly the lodestar of liberalism assumed by political scientists. On 
the other hand, our findings beg the crucial questions: What explains 
the liberal rejection of the First Amendment in disputes pitting rights 
against rights, and what explains the conservative embracement in 
 
 86. See supra fig.7; see also app. B. 
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those same disputes? Several possibilities present themselves, not 
least of which is that First Amendment values are merely 
instrumental of more basic ideological concerns, with equality the 
number one suspect. If support for the First Amendment favors 
equality, then liberals will support it; if not, First Amendment values 
may be little more than an impediment toward their desired goals. 
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APPENDIX A. A DIFFERENT MEASURE OF IDEOLOGY 
In the text, we invoke the Martin-Quinn ideal point estimates to 
measure the Justices’ ideologies. Because Martin and Quinn derive 
their scores from the votes cast by each Justice, our analyses are open 
to the criticism of circularity, that is, of using votes to explain votes.  
In response, we supply this Appendix, in which we validate our 
results against one of the most widely deployed exogenous measures 
of ideology: a score, developed by political scientists Jeffrey A. Segal 
and Albert D. Cover, from newspaper editorials written between the 
time of a Justice’s nomination to the Supreme Court and the Senate’s 
vote.87 As Segal and Cover explain their procedures, they 
trained three students to code each paragraph [in the editorial] 
for political ideology. Paragraphs were coded as liberal, 
moderate, conservative, or not applicable. Liberal statements 
include (but are not limited to) those ascribing support for the 
rights of defendants in criminal cases, women and racial 
minorities in equality cases, and the individual against the 
government in privacy and First Amendment cases. 
Conservative statements are those with an opposite direction. 
Moderate statements include those that explicitly ascribe 
moderation to the nominees or those that ascribe both liberal 
and conservative values.88 
Segal and Cover then measured judicial ideology by weighing the 
scores as 0 for conservative, 0.5 for moderate, and 1.0 for liberal.89 
The resulting scale of ideology (or policy preferences) ranges from 0 
(unanimously conservative), to .50 (moderate), to 1.0 (unanimously 
liberal)—Figure 8 displays the score for each justice serving since 
1953. 
 
 87. Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and Votes of U.S. Supreme 
Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 557 (1989); Jeffrey A. Segal et al., Ideological Values 
and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices Revisited, 57 J. POL. 812, 816 (1995) (updating 
the Segal & Cover scores, supra, to cover Justices Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer). 
Segal has now computed a score for John G. Roberts (.12). 
 88. Segal & Cover, supra note 87, at 559. 
 89. Id.  
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Figure 8: Perceived ideology of Supreme Court Justices based on the Segal-Cover 
scores. The ideological scores range from 0 (most conservative) to 1.0 (most liberal).90 
These ideological scores have developed quite a following in the 
social sciences, and it is not hard to see why. While some exceptions 
emerge (for example, William O. Douglas was more liberal than his 
score; Clarence Thomas was more conservative than his), overall, the 
measure comports with our impressions of the Justices. William 
Brennan and Thurgood Marshall, generally regarded as liberals, 
receive scores of 1.00; Antonin Scalia and William Rehnquist, 
generally regarded as conservatives, receive scores of .00 and .05, 
respectively.91 For purposes of cross validating our results, the 
 
 90. The ideological scores are available in LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT 
COMPENDIUM 361 tbl. 4-16 (2003).  
 91. In fact, scholars have found that the ideological scores provide a satisfactory predictor 
of judicial votes. See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, ADVICE AND CONSENT (2005). 
Certainly, they explain the votes in some issues better they do in others. See Lee Epstein & 
Carol Mershon, Measuring Political Preferences, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 261 (1996). But, overall 
and across a range of cases, they have above-threshold predictive power. For example, for the 
Justices in our study, the correlation between the ideological scores and votes in civil liberties 
cases is .64. 
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scores’ degree of validity (and reliability)92 is important, but equally 
so is that they are independent of Court behavior. 
A. Analyses of the Court Using the Segal-Cover Scores 
To assess the extent to which the ideology of the Court explains 
its decisions in the First Amendment context, we relied on Martin and 
Quinn’s estimates of the location of the median Justice. Here, we use 
the Segal-Cover scores depicted in Figure 8 to calculate the ideology 
of the median Justice for each term in our analysis. Figure 9 depicts 
these Court “swings;” they too (no less than the Martin-Quinn 
estimates)93 are consistent with conventional views of particular 
Court eras, such that liberalism is quite high during the Warren Court 
years (1953 through 1968 terms), and decreases thereafter during the 
Burger and Rehnquist Court eras.  
Invoking these median scores rather than the Martin-Quinn 
estimates produces results generally consistent with the findings 
denoted in Part III.A. 
1. All Cases 
In the text, we show that a statistically significant relationship 
emerges between the Court’s ideology (as measured by the Martin-
Quinn estimates) and its decisions in all First Amendment cases. 
When we substitute the Segal-Cover scores, ideology remains 
significantly related to Court decisions.94 To put it more concretely, 
 
 92. Using π, Segal and his colleagues report reliability results of .72 (p < .001). Charles 
M. Cameron et al., Senate Voting on Supreme Court Nominees, 84 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 525, 533 
(1990). 
 93. See supra p. 101, fig.4. 
 94. Specifically, the estimates are as follows (where ** indicates p < .01 and * indicates p 
< .05; Std. Errs. are robust standard errors clustered on term): 
Variables Coefficient (Std. Err.) 
Ideology of the Court 0.722** (0.273) 
Intercept -0.271** (0.130) 
   
N 506 
Log-likelihood -344.471 
χ2(1) 7.00 
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across the Warren Court era, when the median Justice was a quite 
liberal .76,95 the predicted probability of a pro-First Amendment 
decision is .61 (with a 95% confidence interval of .52–.69). During 
the Rehnquist Court years, that figure fell to .48 (with a 95% 
confidence interval of .43–.54).96 Overall, as we move from an 
extremely conservative (0.0) to an extremely liberal (1.0) Court, the 
predicted probability of the Court deciding in favor of a litigant 
alleging an abridgment of his or her liberties jumps from .39 to .67.97 
2. Pure Cases 
When we conducted the same analysis for the 417 pure First 
Amendment cases (using the Martin-Quinn estimates), our results 
were quite similar: the Court’s ideology and its decisions are 
significantly related. Substituting the Segal-Cover scores requires no 
change of interpretation: ideology remains associated with votes, 
such that we predict a very left-of-center Court, such as the Warren 
Court in its 1968 term (.875 ideology), to rule in favor of the First 
Amendment litigant in about two out of every three “pure” cases 
(predicted probability = .67, with a 95% confidence interval of .56–
.78). A very right-of-center Court, such as the Burger Court in its 
1975 term (.25), in contrast, would support the First Amendment 
claim in fewer than one out of every two pure cases (.47, with the 
confidence interval of .39–.55).98  
 
 95. This represents the mean Segal-Cover score of the median Justice between the 1953 
and 1968 terms. See Segal & Cover, supra note 87. 
 96. The mean score of the median Justice was a rather conservative .32. 
 97. We used CLARIFY to compute these predictions. See supra notes 73, 74. 
 98. We used CLARIFY to compute these predictions. See supra notes 73, 74. The 
underlying estimates for the 417 pure cases (using the Segal-Cover scores) are as follows 
(where ** indicates p < .05 and † indicates p < .10 ; Std. Errs. are robust standard errors 
clustered on term): 
Variables Coefficient (Std. Err.) 
Ideology of the Court 0.849** (0.332) 
Intercept -0.286† (0.172) 
   
N 417 
Log-likelihood -279.905 
χ2(1) 6.546 
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3. Value-Conflict Cases 
As we report in the text, if we measure ideology using the Martin-
Quinn estimates, no statistically significant relationship exists 
between ideology and First Amendment decisions. From an analysis 
using the Segal-Cover scores, a different story emerges. For the 
eighty-nine value-conflict cases, the level of liberalism is negatively 
and significantly associated with the Court’s decision: the more 
liberal the Court, the less likely it is to support a First Amendment 
claim.99 The substantive effect, it turns out, is rather noticeable. For 
example, during the Warren Court years, the predicted probability of 
a liberal decision in a dispute pitting the First Amendment against 
another value is only .22.100 That figure nearly doubles (to .43) during 
the Rehnquist era.101 
 
 99. The estimates for the eighty-nine value-conflict cases are as follows (where _ 
indicates p < .05): 
Variables Coefficient (Std. Err.) 
Ideology of the Court -1.426** (0.620) 
Intercept 0.281** (0.254) 
   
N 89 
Log-likelihood -58.284 
χ2(1) 5.298 
 
 100. The mean liberalism (of the median) is .76. The 95% confidence interval is .09–.39. 
These figures were calculated using CLARIFY. See supra notes 73, 74. 
 101. The mean liberalism (of the median) is .32. The 95% confidence interval is .34–.52. 
These figures were calculated using CLARIFY. See supra notes 73, 74. 
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Figure 9: The political ideology of the median Justice on the U.S. Supreme Court 
based on the Segal-Cover scores, 1953–2004 terms. The line depicts the ideological 
score of the median Justice for each term. The scores indicated on the vertical axis 
measure liberalness, ranging from .2 (conservative) to 1.0 (liberal).102 
B. Analyses of the Justices Using the Segal-Cover Scores 
With the exception of the value-conflict cases, our results for the 
Court track those reported in the text. Likewise, invoking the Segal-
Cover scores for individual Justices (see Figure 8), rather than the 
Martin-Quinn estimates, yields no major discrepancies. 
1. All Cases 
A regression of the proportion of liberal votes cast in all First 
Amendment cases on the Justices’ ideology (as measured by the 
Martin-Quinn approach) shows a strong relationship between the 
two.103 Substituting the Segal-Cover scores leads to no change in 
 
 102. These median scores are available in EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 90, at 242–43 tbl. 3-
12. 
 103. See, e.g., supra p. 106, fig.6. 
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interpretation. As shown in Figure 10 (the Segal-Cover version of 
Figure 6), the more liberal the Justice, the more votes he or she cast 
in favor of a First Amendment claim.104 For example, based on our 
calculations, we expect a very conservative Justice (such as Scalia, 
with an ideology score of 0) to support the litigant alleging a liberties 
abridgment in about 32.45% of the cases;105 Scalia’s actual value is 
38.73. Moving to the highest levels of liberalism (such as Thurgood 
Marshall with an ideology score of 1.0), the expected percentage of 
votes favoring the First Amendment claim is 71.03%;106 Marshall’s 
actual support is 80.94%. 
2. Pure Cases 
If these results closely parallel those reported in the text, as they 
do, then we can say the same of pure cases. Whether we invoke the 
Martin-Quinn estimates or the Segal-Cover scores, the Justices 
evince behavior consistent with the political science literature: 
liberals generally support First Amendment values and conservatives 
support regulation in pure cases.107 
 
 104. For this analysis and all others to follow, we include only those Justices who 
participated in ten or more cases. Figure 10 is based on a regression of the percentage of cases 
in which the Justice cast a liberal vote on the Justice’s Segal-Cover score. The estimates are as 
follows (where ** indicates p < .01): 
Variables Coefficient (Std. Err.) 
Justice’s Ideology 0.377** (0.117) 
Intercept 0.330** (0.071) 
   
N 28 
R2 0.286 
F(1,26) 10.415 
 
 105. The 95% confidence interval is 17.94-44.83. We computed these figures using 
CLARIFY. See supra notes 73, 74. 
 106. The 95% confidence interval is 57.87-84.98. We computed these figures using 
CLARIFY. See supra notes 73, 74. 
 107. The following estimates are from a regression of the percentage of pure cases in which 
the Justice cast a liberal vote on the Justice’s Segal-Cover score (where ** indicates p < .01 and 
* indicates p < .05): 
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3. Value-Conflict Cases 
In the text we report the lack of a statistically significant 
relationship between ideology (using the Martin-Quinn estimates) 
and votes. This finding holds true when we deploy the Segal-Cover 
scores: liberal Justices (or Courts, for that matter) are no more or less 
likely than conservatives to support or oppose regulation of First 
Amendment guarantees when another trumping value comes into 
play (p = .177).  
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Figure 10: The relationship between the ideology of the Justices and their votes in all 
First Amendment cases based on the Segal-Cover scores, 1953–2004 terms. The dotted 
line represents a prediction of Justices’ votes based on their ideology. The closer a 
point to the line, the stronger the association between ideology and votes. Justices 
 
Variables Coefficient (Std. Err.) 
Justice’s Ideology 0.316* (0.125) 
Intercept 0.406** (0.076) 
   
N 28 
R2 0.197 
F(1,26) 6.382 
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above the line cast more liberal votes than predicted; Justices below the line cast more 
conservative votes than predicted.108 
 
 108. For the estimates underlying this figure, see supra note 104. 
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APPENDIX B. THE 1994–2004 TERMS 
The descriptive data in Figure 7 suggest that the Court’s most 
liberal members (Stevens, Ginsburg, Souter, and, to a lesser extent, 
Breyer) were more supportive of First Amendment claims in pure 
disputes than in value-conflict cases. Three of the four most 
conservative Justices (Thomas, Scalia, and Kennedy), on the other 
hand, were more supportive of the First Amendment in cases 
presenting a conflict of values than in pure cases.  
Two sets of analyses lend support to the basic lesson of the 
descriptive data: in value-conflict cases, it is liberals on the Court 
who support regulation, and conservatives who embrace the First 
Amendment. In the first, we simply regressed the proportion of 
value-conflict cases decided by each Justice in favor of the First 
Amendment claim since 1994 on the mean of each Justice’s Martin-
Quinn ideal point estimate. The results indicate that ideology is 
significantly related to votes in these cases, but it is conservatives 
who are more likely than liberals to support First Amendment 
claims.109 
When we estimate the same model for pure cases, the coefficient 
on  the ideology variable  is statistically significant and  negative  
(-6.516; p = .012). What this indicates, in line with Figure 7, is that 
liberals are more likely than conservatives to support the First 
Amendment claim when no other competing values come into play.  
Given the small N (= 9) in these models, we thought it prudent to 
move to a second set of analyses—one that disaggregates to the case 
level.110 These analyses confirm that a reversal of sorts has occurred 
regarding the First Amendment. In the value-conflict cases, right-of-
 
 109. The estimates are as follows (where **dicates p < .01 and * indicates p < .05). Note 
the positively signed coefficient on the Ideology var iniable. 
Variables Coefficient (Std. Err.) 
Justice’s Ideology 5.769* (2.251) 
Intercept 44.402** (4.243) 
   
N 9 
R2 0.484 
F(1,7) 6.566 
 
 110. For more on these types of analyses, see supra note 76. 
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center Justices were significantly more likely, and left-of-center 
Justices significantly less likely, to vote in favor of the speech, press, 
assembly, or association claim. (In the probit analysis, the coefficient 
on the ideology variable is .170, p < .01; N=171.) Once again, in the 
pure cases, it was the liberals who supported the First Amendment, 
and conservatives who supported regulation. (In the probit analysis, 
the coefficient on the Ideology variable is -.130, p < .01; N=387.)  
The substantive effect, it is worth noting, is quite impressive. For 
very conservative Justices, such as Scalia (at 2.97 on Martin and 
Quinn’s measure), the predicted probability of supporting a First 
Amendment claim in the absence of a value conflict is a quite low .37 
(with a 95% confidence interval of .30–.45); that figure skyrockets to 
.67 (the 95% confidence interval is .57–.76) for liberals in the 
category of, for example, Stevens (-2.92). This is precisely what 
traditional conceptions of the First Amendment anticipate: liberal 
Justices support it and conservatives support its regulation. Now 
consider the reversal that occurs in the value-conflict cases: while 
Scalia is likely to support the First Amendment claim (.66),111 
Stevens is likely to oppose it (.27, with a 95% confidence interval of 
.19–.37).112 
 
 111. The 95% confidence interval is .57–.75. 
 112. We computed the predicted probabilities and confidence intervals denoted in this 
paragraph using CLARIFY. For more details, see supra notes 73, 74. The underlying models 
are probits, using robust clustered (on Justice) standard errors. 
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